Claremont Colleges

Scholarship @ Claremont
CMC Senior Theses

CMC Student Scholarship

2011

How Did the Extension of the U.S. Dividend Tax
Cuts in 2010 Affect Stock Prices?
Gayle Lim
Claremont McKenna College

Recommended Citation
Lim, Gayle, "How Did the Extension of the U.S. Dividend Tax Cuts in 2010 Affect Stock Prices?" (2011). CMC Senior Theses. Paper
179.
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/179

This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized
administrator. For more information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.

CLAREMONT McKENNA COLLEGE
HOW DID THE EXTENSION OF THE U.S. DIVIDEND TAX CUTS IN 2010 AFFECT
STOCK PRICES?

SUBMITTED TO
PROFESSOR LISA MEULBROEK
AND
DEAN GREGORY HESS
BY
GAYLE LIM

FOR
SENIOR THESIS
SPRING 2011
25 APRIL 2011

ii
[BLANK PAGE]

iii

Contents
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................... iv
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................v
Introduction ................................................................................................................................1
Literature Review ........................................................................................................................2
Methodology ...............................................................................................................................6
Choice of Event Windows .......................................................................................................7
Data & Findings ........................................................................................................................ 10
Aggregate Effects: US vs. Foreign Equity Indices.................................................................. 10
Cross-Sectional Effects .......................................................................................................... 15
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 20
Appendices ............................................................................................................................... 22
Appendix A: Snapshot of DJIA performance relative to S&P 500 performance over 6-months
(November 2010- April 2011) ............................................................................................... 22
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................. 23

iv

Acknowledgements
The completion of this thesis would not have been possible without my thesis reader,
Professor Lisa Meulbroek, who provided advice, guidance and support throughout the writing
process. I would also like to thank all the other incredible professors I have had the opportunity
to learn from during my time at Claremont McKenna College, particularly Professor Sven Arndt
and Professor Manfred Keil. Finally, I owe a huge debt of gratitude to my parents, siblings and
friends for encouraging me at each step of my college career and during the thesis-writing
process.

v

Abstract
The efficacy of the 2001 and 2003 Bush tax cuts was a major topic of discussion in the
2010 midterm elections. I investigate the effect of the possible expiration and eventual extension
of the dividend tax cut on US stock market performance in 2010 based on the methodology used
by Amronin, Harrison and Sharpe (2008). I compare aggregate performance of US common
stocks relative to foreign stocks using equity indices, and examine cross-sectional performance
amongst US stocks by creating different stock portfolios based on their dividend yield. This
comparison is done over two event windows, (1) 20-24 September 2010 and (2) 3-8 December
2010. Consistent with previous studies, I find that the US stock market did respond to negative
and positive news on the extension of the Bush-era dividend tax cuts, with stock prices falling
and rising, respectively. My findings also suggest that this aggregate effect was probably muted
by the redistribution of funds by investors from lower-yield to higher-yield stocks. Unlike in
2003, however, in the post-financial crisis context of 2010, the redistribution seemed to
particularly favor stocks with medium-dividend yield, rather than smaller, higher-risk stocks
with the highest dividend yield.
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Introduction
In 2010, the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA,
often referred to as the 2001 Bush Tax Cuts) and Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act
of 2003 (JGTRRA, also known as the 2003 Bush Tax Cuts) came up for debate in Congress.
Amongst the tax rates that were set to increase were taxes on individual dividend tax income,
which had been lowered in the 2003 JGTRRA. If the tax cuts expired, dividend taxes would rise
from 15% to the 1990s rate of up to 39.6%. The dividend tax cuts had initially been set to expire
on 31 December 2008, but were extended by the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act
of 2005 (TIPRA), which pushed their expiration date to 31 December 2010.
The main issue of contention in 2010 was the extension of the tax cuts for taxpayers of all
income levels; Democrats wanted the tax cuts to expire for higher-income earners 1 , while
Republicans were in support of making the tax cuts permanent for all. In addition, Congressmen
on both sides of the aisle argued that the tax cuts should not be allowed to expire in 2010 because
of the state of the economy; they argued that extending the dividend tax cut would keep the cost
of equity capital low, stimulate investment by firms and thus lead to economic growth and job
creation. The 111th Congress eventually passed the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance
Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 20102, which extended the Bush Tax Cuts, including
the dividend tax cuts, for all income levels until 2012. In addition, the bill extended jobless
benefits and business tax relief measures 3 and reduced payroll taxes by 2% in calendar year
2011. It also alters the Internal Revenue Service code to exempt estates worth less than $5
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i.e. Individuals who earned more than $200,000 and couples with a combined income of more than $250,000
The bill, H.R. 4856 was signed into Public Law 111-312 by President Obama on 17 December 2010
3
E.g. Allowing for accelerated depreciation of capital expenditure
2

2
million 4 from being subject to an estate tax, and sets the maximum estate tax at 35%
(Congressional Research Service, 2010).
The effect of these tax cuts is a major issue of debate, particularly given the ballooning
federal deficit, and the direct impact tax cuts have on worsening that deficit. However, although
a great deal of literature exists that evaluates the effect of the implementation of the 2003 tax
cuts on US stock market performance, there is no broad consensus on whether they were good or
bad for US stocks. While this lack of consensus is not surprising for such a highly politicized
topic, the importance of the topic should motivate further research in order to gain an accurate
understanding of the situation. The events of 2010, which saw the tax cuts under threat of expiry
and eventually extended, provide an opportunity to do just that. Specifically, this paper uses the
methodology set out in Amronin, Harrison and Sharpe (2008) to test the hypothesis that the
threat of the 2003 dividend tax expiring cuts lowered US stock prices, while their extension
boosted US stock prices. This reaction would reflect whether the market believed the tax cuts
were good for the economy.

Literature Review
The effect of individual-level dividend taxes on stock prices has been the topic of much
economic research, with the literature examining both aggregate-level and cross-sectional
effects.
On an aggregate level, Poterba (2004) hypothesized that the dividend tax cut would
reduce the tax burden on projected dividend payouts, increasing firm value and thus stock prices.
He capitalizes annual foregone tax revenue as a crude measure of the gain in US equities, and
estimates a 6% gain in US equities in the first 2 quarters of 2003. Auerbach and Hassett (2005)
4
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also find that a reduction in dividend taxes increases firm valuation, particularly for highdividend yield firms.
Similarly, Dhaliwal, Krull and Li (2005) studied three ex-ante measures of the implied
cost of capital over a three-year period 5 , using methods developed by Gebhardt, Lee and
Swaminathan (2001), Claus and Thomas (2001) and Gode and Mohanram (2003). All three of
these models are a variation of the Feltham-Ohlson residual income model and use stock prices
to calculate the implied cost of equity capital, but they each specify different assumptions about
the factors that determine the growth rate of earnings in perpetuity. They find that in their sample
group, the mean implied cost of equity capital fell by 1.47% from the effective date of the 2003
tax act, suggesting that the dividend tax cuts achieved their intended effect of lowering the cost
of equity capital, and that dividend taxation affects firm valuation. A major weakness of their
study, however, is that they do not really control for non-tax related events during their threeyear study period. Furthermore, as Amronin et al (2008) note, a key assumption in Dhaliwal et
al’s methodology is a stable equity risk premium throughout their period of study. During the
three-year period that Dhaliwal et al study, however, the equity risk premium would have been
influenced heavily by (1) a string of accounting scandals and the regulatory response these
scandals generated, and (2) developments leading up to the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003.
These non-tax events would have provided external shocks to the stock market.
To control for non-tax factors influencing the performance of the stock market, some
economists have thus favored the event study approach, where stock market data from a narrow
time period surrounding a key development is examined. Due to this short time horizon, event
studies allow one to examine the effects of specific events in relative isolation. Event studies on
financial events and literature on the methodology of event studies have been around since the
5

For six quarters before and after the passage of the 2003 Tax Act, i.e. 1 October 2001 to 30 September 2004
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1980s (e.g. Brown and Warner, 1980 & 1985), and there is agreement within the field that event
studies can provide reliable information when conducted correctly. Specifically, event study tests
must correctly specify both (1) that the abnormal returns during the chosen event window are
significantly different from zero, and (2) that the model used to find those cumulative abnormal
returns is accurate (Kothari and Warner, 2004).
One such event study is Amronin et al’s (2008) research into the aggregate and crosssectional effects of the dividend tax cut in 2003. They study two event windows when there was
significant positive or negative information about the dividend tax cut. Their two event windows
are (1) 3-9 January 2003 and (2) 14-28 May 2003. Window (1) captured the market reaction to
the Washington Post announcement of the some details of President Bush’s dividend tax cut
plan, as well as Bush’s speech on the plan at the Economics Club of Chicago. Window (2)
tracked the passage and reconciliation of the tax cut bill through the chambers of Congress
through its signing into law. Their choice of event windows coincides with those chosen by
Auerbach and Hassett (2005), who study the effect of the dividend tax cuts on the value of the
firm. Amronin et al find ―little if any imprint of the dividend tax cut news on the value of the
aggregate stock market,‖ although, based on their findings, they attribute this more to portfolio
reallocation from low-dividend to high-dividend stocks. From these results, they infer that the
cost of equity capital does not fall, a leap in logic that is not well-supported throughout the rest
of their paper. Nonetheless, their overall methodology seems sound, and I use a similar
methodology to study the effects of the 2010 tax-related events on the stock market.
The effect of tax cuts on stock prices at the aggregate level also depends on whether the
cuts were expected or unexpected, temporary or permanent. Gourio and Miao (2010) classify the
2003 JGTRRA as unexpected and temporary, given that there were sunset provisions built into

5
the bill and that the details of the bill that was ultimately passed were relatively uncertain until
before May 2003. This view that the JGTRRA cuts were unexpected is further supported by
other economists, including Auerbach and Hassett (2005) and Chetty, Rosenberg and Saez
(2005). Gourio and Miao find that when tax cuts are permanent, ―aggregate capital, investment,
consumption, output, labor, and total factor productivity all increase in the steady state, [as do]
aggregate dividend payments and equity issuance.‖ When tax cuts are unexpected and
temporary, however, ―the steady state does not change,‖ and ―aggregate investment decreases
and aggregate dividend payments increase during the periods when the tax cuts are
implemented.‖
At a cross-sectional level, studies on the 1993 and 2003 changes in dividend taxes in the
US suggest that changes in rates of dividend taxation do affect share prices, and that the
magnitude of change on share prices is influenced by dividend payout policy. Ayers, Cloyd and
Robinson (2002), Amronin et al (2008) and Auerbach and Hassett (2005) all find that the share
prices of high-dividend stocks increase (decrease) more than lower-dividend paying stocks when
dividend taxes fall (rise).
Two other factors that affect cross-sectional performance are (1) the tax status of the
marginal investor, (2) the relative rates of capital gains and dividend taxes. With regards to the
former, logic suggests that firms with higher proportions of institutional holdings would be less
affected by changes in the individual dividend tax rate, and thus face smaller price fluctuations
when personal dividend tax rates change. Ayers et al (2002) demonstrate that this intuition is
consistent with empirical evidence from the 1993 rise in dividend taxes.
Secondly, the relative capital gains and dividend tax rates also affect the impact on stock
market prices, with relatively higher dividend tax rates discouraging dividend payouts (e.g.
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Gourio and Miao, 2010; Chetty and Saez, 2005). In the US, capital gains are tax-advantaged
because they are taxed only upon realization. In addition, from 1990 until 2003, capital gains
faced a significantly lower tax rate than dividends6. For instance, Chetty and Saez (2005) find
that the elimination of most of the tax benefits of capital gains relative to dividend payouts from
the 2003 JGTRRA significantly increased dividend payments. The 2003 JGTRRA equalized
capital gains and dividend tax rates for the first time since 1990 (Dhiwali et al, 2006).
Finally, one interesting finding in cross-sectional studies is that the 2003 dividend tax
cuts seemed to benefit zero-dividend firms the most. Amronin et al (2008) find that the nondividend paying firms gain larger cumulative abnormal returns than dividend-paying firms when
the market learnt about the proposed dividend tax cuts, and Auerbach and Hassett (2005) find
that the increase in firm value is largest for zero-dividend firms. Similarly, Dhaliwal, Krull and
Li (2005) and Guenther, Jung and Williams (2005), who studied the effect of the tax cuts on the
cost of equity capital, both find that after the 2003 tax cuts, the decrease in the cost of equity is
larger for non-dividend paying firms than for dividend-paying firms. Amronin et al (2008)
attribute this observation to a global spike in zero-dividend stock prices that is not related to tax
effects.

Methodology
I develop my event study methodology based on that used by Amronin, Harrison and
Sharpe (2008) to study the impact of the dividend tax cuts in 2003. Their fundamental strategy is
to compare the change in value of a portfolio of US equities vis-à-vis that of a benchmark
portfolio that would not have been similarly affected by US dividend tax policy. For instance, to

6

In 2003, long term capital gains taxes were reduced from a maximum of 20% to 15%; corresponding dividend
taxes fell from 39.6% to 15%
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calculate cumulative abnormal returns at an aggregate level, they compare the performance of
the S&P 500 with that of the S&P Euro 350 and the Morgan Stanley Capital International index
for Europe, Australasia and the Far East (MSCI EAFE).
One weakness in their methodology, however, is that instead of using the levels of the
foreign indices, they used i-Share Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs) 7 as substitutes. While this
might minimize problems with nonsynchronity, the fact that these ETFs are traded in US markets
increases the likelihood that they are owned and traded by US taxpayers. The ETFs are thus
more likely to be affected by the US dividend tax cuts than the foreign indices they are based on.
I alter their methodology in this aspect by using the values of the actual foreign indices, rather
than their i-Share ETFs.

Choice of Event Windows
Event studies select event windows around significant information releases or
developments in a situation. The complex political process surrounding the extension of the Bush
tax cuts in 2010, however, is prone to information leakage and uncertainty about the ultimate
passage of the bill. As such, I imitated the methodology put forth in Ayers et al (2002) and
Amronin et al (2008) by choosing a short event window surrounding unexpected developments. I
gauged the unexpectedness of a development by conducting a qualitative survey of newspaper
articles in the Wall Street Journal, Washington Post and the New York Times. To get a
quantitative measure of how much the tax cuts were on the public’s mind, I also tracked the
volume of articles in those three newspapers that mentioned the extension of the Bush tax cuts
(see Figure 1). In addition, I also took note of the placement of the articles. Based on this

7
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quantitative and qualitative examination, I selected the following event windows: (1) 20-24
September 2010 and (2) 3-8 December 2010.
Table 1: Key Events
Date
18 Sep 2010, Sat
20 Sep 2010, Mon
22 Sep 2010, Wed

23 Sep 2010, Thu
6 Dec 2010, Mon—
Morning
6 Dec 2010, Mon—
Evening
7 Dec 2010, Tue

Event
The Wall Street Journal reports in a front-page article that Nancy
Pelosi is facing dissent from within her party about the tax cuts.
The Washington Post reports that Democrats are ―close to vote on
tax cuts.‖
The New York Times reports that the vote on the tax cuts might
be pushed to after the elections; Democratic congressional leaders
plan to meet for lunch on Thursday, 23 September 2010, to
discuss the cuts
Democrats decide to push vote on tax cuts till after the elections.
Newspapers report that the White House and Republicans are
close to reaching an agreement on the tax cuts
President Obama reaches a compromise with Republican leaders
on the tax cuts.
Significant news coverage, including front page reporting, on the
compromise reached. Business analysts explicitly attribute the rise
in the stock market to this event.

Figure 1: Volume of Newspaper Articles on the Bush Tax Cuts in 2010

No. of Articles on Bush Tax Cuts
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

*From the Wall Street Journal, Washington Post and New York Times
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The first event window represents a period where negative information was released
regarding the extension of the tax cuts; the uncertainty was prolonged, and the possibility of the
tax cuts expiring before a compromise was reached increased, since the negotiation window
shrunk to the post-election months. The second event window represents a release of positive
information since the bipartisan compromise increased the likelihood that the tax cuts would be
extended.
When dividend tax rates are expected to rise, investors are willing to pay less for
dividend-paying stocks than before because they expect lower post-tax dividend payouts under
the higher taxes, thus causing the share prices of dividend-paying firms to fall. I expect that the
price decrease will be larger for firms with higher dividend yields because the decrease in the
value of post-tax dividends is largest for them.
To ensure that my event windows are not clouded by information other than news about
the dividend tax cut, I also looked at the other major news topics during the event windows to
see if they might have had an impact on stock performance. During the September event
window, the other major news topics were the rallying of the Dow Jones Industrial Average
(DJIA) and the 2010 midterm elections, with the Republicans releasing their ―Pledge to
America‖ on 23rd September 2010. With regards to the news about the DJIA, given that the DJIA
and S&P 500 generally move in sync 8, the gain in the DJIA could have mitigated the negative
effect I expect to see during the September window. Although the focus on the midterm elections
in the months leading up to November probably did cloud stock market performance, this
influence is inevitable for any event window around that time period. Nonetheless, the decision
by Democratic congressional leaders to delay the vote on the tax cuts until after the midterm

8

See Appendix A for a 6-month snapshot of the performance of the DJIA relative to the S&P 500
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elections still garnered front-page coverage in the Wall Street Journal, and main-section
coverage by the Washington Post and New York Times.
During the December event window, other than the tax cuts, the lackluster performance
of the Treasuries market received significant news coverage. Business analysts, however,
concluded the ―plunge‖ in U.S. Treasury prices was partly ―in response to President Barack
Obama's proposal to extend tax cuts that could support economic growth in the short term but
raise national debt levels longer term‖ (Magrowski, 2010) and partly due to investors being
willing to invest in riskier assets. In addition, the business press also explicitly attributed the rise
in the S&P 500 and the NASDAQ Composite Index to the tax compromise brokered between the
White House and Republicans 9, and the tax compromise received front-page coverage in the
Wall Street Journal and the New York Times. This qualitative survey thus seems to indicate that
the tax cuts were the primary news topic that would have affected the stock market during the
event windows.
I thus expect that during the first event window (20-24 September 2010), stock prices,
particularly those of the highest-dividend paying stocks, would have fallen. Conversely, I expect
stock prices to rise in the latter event window (3-8 December 2010), and predict that this effect
will be most pronounced amongst the stocks with the highest dividend yield.

Data & Findings
Aggregate Effects: US vs. Foreign Equity Indices
The foreign equity indices serve as benchmark portfolios to gauge market performance
that is less affected by news about the Bush tax cuts. US investors, the individuals potentially

9

E.g. Bloomberg Businessweek reported on 7 December 2010, ―Stocks pop after Obama, GOP agree on taxes‖
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affected if the tax cuts were not extended, hold a relatively small proportion of foreign stocks10.
By comparing US equity indices to foreign equity indices, I would then be able to observe if
there was an overall abnormal market reaction in the US during the event windows.
I obtained data on stock market index performance for both large- and small- cap indices
from Yahoo Finance, MSCI and Bloomberg. Firms are considered to have large capitalizations
(―large cap‖) if their market capitalization (i.e. total market value of their equity) exceeds US$10
billion. Examples of large cap firms include Microsoft, Exxon Mobil and Apple. I used the S&P
500 as the large cap equity index for the US, and compared its performance to that of the S&P
Euro 350 and the MSCI EAFE 11. The S&P Euro 350 reflects equity market performance of
seventeen major European markets, and covers 70% of Europe’s market capitalization. The
MSCI EAFE captures equity performance in developed markets outside North America. It
consists of stocks from twenty two different countries in Europe, Australasia and the Far East.
Firms are considered to have small capitalizations (―small cap‖) if their market
capitalization is less than US$10 billion. For the baseline US performance, I used the Russell
2000 Index, which measures small-cap US equity. It is comprised of approximately 2,000 of the
smallest securities, as determined by their market cap and current index membership. The
Russell 2000 was compared to the Financial Times and London Stock Exchange (FTSE) Small
Cap Index, which covers over 4,600 small cap stocks drawn from forty eight countries, and the
MSCI World ex. USA SC Index, which captures small cap firm’s equity performance from
developed countries excluding the US.
These data sources have been previously used by Amronin et al (2008) in their study of
the effects of the dividend tax cuts in 2003, both when plans of the dividend tax cuts were first

10
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Estimated at about 10-15% of European equity markets (Amronin et al, 2008)
Morgan Stanley Capital International index for Europe, Australasia and the Far East
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publicized, and later, when the plans were signed into law. The indices chosen are generally
regarded as bell-weathers for stock market performance in their respective regions. The data are
also accurate, since they are publicly-available metrics of index performance and from reliable
sources.
I compared the performance of the indices in two ways: firstly, by converting the equity
indices’ performance into a relative index, where the closing price on the eve of the key event is
set as the baseline (i.e. index performance on the eve = 100). 20 September 2010 and 3
December 2010 are the baselines for the September and December event windows, respectively.
Figure 2: Large Cap Performance (September Event Window)
September Event Window
108.00%
106.00%
104.00%
102.00%
100.00%
98.00%
96.00%
94.00%
92.00%
90.00%
88.00%

S&P 500

01-Sep-2010
03-Sep-2010
08-Sep-2010
10-Sep-2010
14-Sep-2010
16-Sep-2010
20-Sep-2010
22-Sep-2010
24-Sep-2010
28-Sep-2010
30-Sep-2010
04-Oct-2010
06-Oct-2010
08-Oct-2010
12-Oct-2010
14-Oct-2010
18-Oct-2010
20-Oct-2010
22-Oct-2010
26-Oct-2010
28-Oct-2010

S&P Euro 350
MSCI EAFE

Figure 3: Large Cap Performance (December Event Window)
December Event Window
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04-Nov-2010
09-Nov-2010
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01-Dec-2010
06-Dec-2010
09-Dec-2010
14-Dec-2010
17-Dec-2010
22-Dec-2010
28-Dec-2010
31-Dec-2010
05-Jan-2011
10-Jan-2011
13-Jan-2011
19-Jan-2011
24-Jan-2011
27-Jan-2011

S&P Euro 350
MSCI EAFE
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Figure 4: Small Cap Performance (September Event
Window)

Figure 5: Small Cap Performance (December Event Window)
December Event Window
110.00%
105.00%
100.00%
95.00%
90.00%

Russell 2000
FTSE Small Cap
MSCI World ex. US

85.00%
80.00%

In addition, I also measured the difference in the holding period return of the US indices
relative to the two benchmark indices. I used data from two estimation periods to find the
historical and bootstrapped standard errors of this difference. The estimation period for the
September event window was the 6-month period before the event window (March-August
2010), and for the latter, the 3-month period after December 2010 (January-March 2011). The
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shorter duration of the second estimation period is due to the recent nature of the second event
window. The results of the analysis are presented here:
Table 2: Cumulative Return Differences for US and Foreign Equities Indices

Panel A. S&P 500 versus S&P Euro 350 and MSCI EAFE
S&P 500 Less S&P Euro
S&P 500 Less MSCI
350
EAFE
Event Window
Sep 20-24
Dec 3-8
Sep 20-24
Dec 3-8
Differences in holding period
returns (in percent)
Bootstrapped standard error
of the difference
Historical standard error of
the difference

-1.73%

0.14%

-0.98%

0.40%

2.91%

1.25%

1.02%

1.14%

2.89%

1.28%

1.03%

1.23%

Panel B. Russell 2000 versus FTSE Small Cap and MSCI World Ex. US Small Cap

Event Window
Differences in holding period
returns (in percent)
Bootstrapped standard error
of the difference
Historical standard error of
the difference

Russell 2000 Less FTSE
Small Cap
Sep 20-24
Dec 3-8

Russell 2000 Less MSCI
World Ex. US Small Cap
Sep 20-24
Dec 3-8

-1.04%

0.08%

-1.70%

0.91%

2.16%

1.36%

1.72%

1.66%

2.10%

1.41%

1.77%

1.74%

The differences in holding period returns are in the expected direction, with the US
indices underperforming their foreign counterparts during the September event window and
outperforming them in the December event window. This is consistent with findings from the
changes in dividend tax rates in 1993 (Ayers et al, 2002) and 2003 (Amronin et al, 2008).
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That being said, even the most significant difference, between the Russell 2000 and
MSCI Small Cap index for the September window, is still less than the estimated standard errors.
However, this lack of significant abnormal returns at the aggregate level is not completely
unexpected. One possible explanation is the theory of portfolio reallocation put forth in Amronin
et al (2008), where they theorized that investors could have reallocated their investment
portfolios from high- to low- dividend stocks in reaction to a potential rise in dividend taxes
(such as the September event window), and vice versa when faced with a cut in dividend taxes
(such as the December event window). I thus test this hypothesis by examining the crosssectional performance of US stocks during the event windows.

Cross-Sectional Effects
I accessed Compustat, Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and CompustatCRSP data via the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS), and
filtered the data to select actively-traded US equities12. I then excluded Real Estate Investment
Trusts (REITs), since REITs enjoy corporate tax breaks as long as they distribute a minimum of
90% of their taxable income to investors13 (IRS, 2011). REITs would thus not be affected by
either the termination or extension of the 2003 Bush tax cuts. This resulted in a sample of 3627
firms. The data used is from fiscal year 2009.
I then separated the firms into portfolios based on their 2009 dividend yield. Just under
60% of the firms (2173 firms) were zero-dividend firms. Of the remaining 40%, the top quartile
(363 firms) based on dividend yield were classified as ―High-dividend‖, the bottom quartile (363
firms) ―Low-dividend‖ and the middle 50% (728 firms) ―Medium-dividend.‖ Select

12

The CRSP dataset classifies stocks as either ―active‖ or ―inactive;‖ in choosing my dataset, I only checked the box
for ―actively traded‖
13
IRS guidelines on REITs: http://www.irs.gov/instructions/i1120rei/ch01.html
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characteristics of the firms in the various portfolios reflect that the high-dividend firms tend to be
relatively small compared to the medium- and low- dividend firms.
Table 3: Firm Characteristics by Dividend Portfolio
Firm Characteristics by Dividend Yield Portfolio
Number
Portfolio
of
Dividend
Firms
Yield
Zero-div
Low-div
Med-div
High-div

2173
363
728
363

0.00%
0.76%
2.69%
6.41%

Median

Mean

Total
LT
LT
PPE/ Dividend Total Assets
PPE/
Assets
Debt/
Debt/
Assets
Yield
(Mil)
Assets
(Mil)
Assets
Assets
339.825
5.85% 11.61%
0.00%
6178.766318 15.85% 21.94%
2358.894 11.28% 18.21%
2.79%
40327.89392 15.09% 25.57%
2935.182 12.37% 12.98%
0.76%
24225.00214 16.17% 23.23%
1391.2015 16.00% 12.24%
8.15%
27145.7031 23.02% 28.86%

I also calculated the estimated factor loadings of the portfolios using the March to August
2010 estimation period. The factor loadings were calculated by regressing the portfolio returns
on the single market factor (Rm - Rf), as well as the Fama-French factors, according to the
following equations:
ri = rf + βMKT (rm - rf) + εi

— (1a)

ri = rf + βMKT (rm - rf) +βSMB (rS -rB) + βHML (rH –rL) + εi

— (2b)

The Fama-French equation, equation (2), uses the following shorthand:


SMB: ―Small Minus Big;‖ measures the return differences of a portfolio of small-cap
versus large cap stocks



HML: ―High Minus Low;‖ measure the return differences of a portfolio of stocks with
high book-to-market ratios versus that with low book-to-market ratios

Rm was taken to be the daily return of the S&P 500, and Rf the rate which would give the onemonth T-bill rate when compounded for a month. The Fama-French factors were not available
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for March 2011, so I did not calculate a similar regression to find the factor loadings for the latter
estimation period.
Table 4: Estimated Factor Loadings
Estimated Factor Loadings, by Dividend Yield Portfolio
Number
Portfolio
of Firms
Zero-div
Low-div
Med-div
High-div

2173
363
728
363

Equal-Weighted Portfolios
Market
βMKT
1.07
1.18
1.06
0.84

MKT

β
0.863
0.995
0.950
0.732

Fama-French
βSMB
βHML
0.541
0.171
0.300
0.243
0.274
0.035
0.190
0.127

The estimated factor loadings are consistent with those found in Amronin et al (2008),
with β being somewhat inversely related to the dividend yield of the portfolio. However, where
Amronin et al’s factor loadings were all less than one, my factor loadings for all but the highdividend portfolio are greater than one.
The next step I took was to calculate the cumulative return on each of the portfolios over
the event windows. I used the estimated factor loadings from Table 4 to calculate cumulative
abnormal returns, αi, according to the following equations:
αiM = (ri – rf) αiFF = (ri – rf) -

i

MKT

(rm – rf ) -

MKT
i

(rm – rf )

SMB
(rS
i

-rB) -

— (2a)
HML
i

(rH –rL)

— (2b)

Item (3) in Table 5, the CAR Standard Error, was calculated by taking the standard deviation of
the 3- or 4- trading-day14 CAR during the estimation period.

14

3 trading days’ CAR to estimate the CAR S.E. for the December event window, and 4 trading days’ CAR for the
September event window
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Table 5: Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Dividend Portfolio—Single Factor Model

Portfolio

(1)
Cumulative
Return

(2)
CAR

(3)
CAR
Standard
Deviation

Panel A. September Event Window (Sep. 20-24, 2010)
Zero-div
0.86%
0.19%
1.03%
Low-div
0.24%
-0.49%
1.02%
Medium-div
0.22%
-0.45%
0.61%
High-div
0.21%
-0.35%
0.95%
Panel B. December Event Window (Dec. 3-8, 2010)
Zero-div
0.45%
0.13%
0.86%
Low-div
0.32%
-0.03%
0.83%
Medium-div
0.46%
0.15%
0.52%
High-div
0.28%
0.03%
0.78%

Table 6: Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Dividend Portfolio—Fama-French

Portfolio

(1)
Cumulative
Return

(2)
CAR

(3)
CAR
Standard
Deviation

Panel A. September Event Window (Sep. 20-24, 2010)
Zero-div
0.86%
-1.60%
2.87%
Low-div
0.24%
-2.30%
2.60%
Medium-div
0.22%
-2.10%
2.52%
High-div
-1.61%
2.17%
0.21%
Panel B. December Event Window (Dec. 3-8, 2010)
Zero-div
0.45%
0.45%
2.38%
Low-div
0.32%
0.16%
2.22%
Medium-div
0.46%
0.41%
2.10%
High-div
0.28%
0.18%
1.82%

The results in the September event window are consistent with my hypothesis, with the
dividend yield of the portfolio inversely relating to the strength of performance, and the CARs in
both event windows being in the expected directions. This result is consistent with the initial

19
hypothesis that stocks with the highest dividend yields would be subject to the largest penalty if
dividend taxes were to rise, and thus suffer the most during the September event window. These
results, however, are not supported by the CARs. This could be due to the factor loadings for the
high-dividend portfolio (Table 4) being less than one, while that of the other three portfolios was
greater than one.
The returns for the December event window are more puzzling than that of the September
event window. Excluding the zero-dividend stocks, which did not perform as expected in the
studies of the 2003 dividend tax cut, the high-dividend stocks still perform more poorly than
expected. Instead of being the portfolio with the largest returns and CAR, the high-dividend
portfolio has the lowest cumulative return and a CAR much lower than that of the mediumdividend portfolio. This, however, could be due to the shorter duration of the dividend tax cuts in
2010. In 2003, the lower dividend tax rates would have been effective for five years, while in
2010, they were only extended for two years. In addition, investors might still have been wary of
investing in smaller, high-risk, high-dividend firms in the wake of the 2007 financial crisis.
The consistent strong performance of the zero-dividend portfolio is an unexpected result
that was also observed across-the-board in studies of the initial implementation of the 2003 tax
cuts. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to fully explain this result, this observation could
reflect the underlying quality and high-growth potential of zero-dividend firms. After all, by not
paying a dividend, such firms signal that all investment earnings have productive purposes
through reinvestment. Particularly in a post-crisis period such as 2010, investors might seek to
purchase equity stakes in such firms to ensure more sustained growth. In addition, the constancy
of this observation in both 2003 and 2010 suggests that there are significant factors influencing
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the performance of zero-dividend stocks that are still not well-understood and thus should be
further researched.
Finally, none of the CAR results are statistically significant, and amongst these, the
medium-dividend portfolio has the most significant results. This lack of statistically significant
results is similar to that found by Amronin et al (2008), although their two significant CAR
results were for the high-dividend portfolio, which thus provides stronger support for the
hypothesis of portfolio reallocation. In the context of this study, however, significant CARs on
the high-dividend portfolio are precluded by their unexpectedly poor performance, which, as
mentioned above, could be due to the shorter duration of the dividend tax-cut and greater riskaversion amongst investors in a post-crisis environment.

Conclusion
I investigate the effect of the possible expiration and eventual extension of the dividend
tax cut on US stock market performance in 2010. I compare aggregate performance of US
common stocks relative to foreign stocks using bell-weather equity indices, and examine crosssectional performance amongst US stocks by creating different stock portfolios based on their
dividend yield. This comparison is done over two event windows, (1) 20-24 September 2010 and
(2) 3-8 December 2010.
Consistent with previous studies, I find that the US stock market did respond to negative
and positive news on the extension of the Bush-era dividend tax cuts, with stock prices falling
and rising, respectively. Although the aggregate level reaction was not statistically significant,
this could be due to portfolio redistribution by investors. This theory of portfolio redistribution is
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supported to a limited extent by cross-sectional performance, with the dividend yield being
inversely related to cumulative returns in the September event window.
These findings, however, are not always consistent with the CAR, and the CARs lack
statistical significance. This suggests that more research should be done on these events, possibly
further in the future from these event windows so as to ensure a more accurate estimation period
that straddles both event windows. Such research would be highly relevant to the debate that will
arise in 2012 when the dividend tax cuts are set to expire.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Snapshot of DJIA performance relative to S&P 500 performance over
6-months (November 2010- April 2011)

Source: Yahoo Finance

DJI: Dow Jones Industrial Average
GSPC: S&P 500 Index
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